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Abstract 
In this paper we apply conjoint analysis as an empirical method to study the influence of tax 
labeling and tax earmarking on the perceived tax burden. As reference for the individual 
behavior we use the model of a rational utility maximizer described by the economic theory. 
We determine a significant influence of the labeling and the earmarking of taxes. We can 
show that the labeling and earmarking effect can decrease the perceived tax burden for the test 
persons which results in a deviation from a (rational) consumption maximizing behavior. 
These results give important implications for tax policy regarding further reforms of the tax 
and contribution system.   
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In tax effects theory it is commonly assumed that taxpayers aim to maximize their 
consumption utility and with it – in a given labor supply – their net income. This assumption 
also implies the sub goal of taxpayers, namely to minimize their tax burden (in general: their 
contribution burden) in order to reach the largest possible consumption potential. 
Particularly studies on the willingness to evade taxes have shown that this neoclassical 
assumption is not always fulfilled in reality (Jonas, Heine, and Frey 1999 pp. 164ff. with 
further references). Many taxpayers seem to attach a positive utility to taxes and further 
contributions, as long as these contributions are consistent with their own sense of fairness 
and they find the contributions reasonable. Therefore attributes of a contribution such as its 
labeling can influence the individual evaluation of this duty and the subjective perceived 
burden.  
This study attempts to measure the influence of contribution labeling as well as the use of the 
tax revenue (appropriation or earmarking) on the perceived burden of the taxpayers through 
this contribution. For this purpose a conjoint analysis was conducted, in which test persons 
were given the opportunity to rank different combinations of contributions. The contributions 
available to choose from in this case included the health insurance premium, income tax 
payable, and a fictitious education allowance. This method was used to determine how the 
naming of a contribution (labeling) as well as its designated use (earmarking) affects the 
acceptance of this contribution in the population.  
This question is of theoretical as well as political relevance. If the basic rationality 
assumptions used to analyze the effects of fiscal decisions are incorrect and taxpayers not 
only strive to maximize their net income, then this has repercussions on the decision effects of 
a tax as well as on the perceived distribution of the burden. From a political perspective, 
knowledge of the effects of labeling and earmarking of contributions could be used to identify 
approaches to increase the acceptance of the tax system in the population and, where 
applicable, to minimize tax avoidance strategies and evasion behavior on the part of 
taxpayers. Congdon et al. 2009 analyze the implications of behavioral economics for tax 
policy, e.g. for welfare consequences of taxation. They come to the result that the welfare 
consequences are ambiguous if the taxpayer’s decisions are not rational. The deviation of the 
taxpayers behavior from the rational assumptions is also a result of our experimental study. 
This article is structured as follows: In section 2 we will first present a literature review of this 
topic, and then subsequently in section 3 we will derive our hypotheses on the behavior of 
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taxpayers in the selection of a specific combination of contributions. Section 4 describes the 
sample, the method of the conjoint analysis, the concrete research design, and the results of 
the study. In section 5 we will discuss the results as well as elaborate upon possible 
explanations. Section 6 presents our conclusions and topics for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The starting point in modern public finance of the tax earmarking discussion is Buchanan 
1963.  He analyzes the economic effects of earmarked taxes and their influence on the 
individual’s behavior within a theoretical model, and he discloses differences between 
earmarking and general-fund financing under restrictive model assumptions. Based on this 
paper, Goetz 1968 develops a modified model and shows that the normative conclusions 
become less determinate under less restrictive assumptions. Mc Cleary 1991 extends the 
theoretical models with World Bank case studies. He comes to the result that earmarking does 
not work very well in real settings. 
The effects of labeling and earmarking of taxes are often discussed in papers that address the 
incentives of tax evasion. The focus of many studies is the impact of the public use of 
taxpayers' money on the willingness to evade taxes. Kolm 1973 provides a basis in that he 
explicitly integrates the utility of the public goods, which were financed through taxes 
involved in tax evasion decisions in an evasion model. Vogel 1974 determines through 
surveys that in Sweden the willingness to evade taxes decreased when the tax payment was 
accompanied by a certain consideration. Lewis 1979 reaches similar conclusions for Great 
Britain. Baldry 1986 shows that a difference between gambling and tax evasion is the 
existence of ‘moral costs’ in the latter decision situation. Furthermore, Spicer and Becker 
1980 come to the conclusion through experiments that the willingness to evade taxes 
decreases the higher the perceived tax justness and tax fairness. A model theoretical 
explanation for this is provided by Cowell 1992. Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne 1989 
use an econometric estimation of an evasion model based on aggregated data (difference 
between fiscal and non-fiscal household income statistics) for Swiss Cantons to show that tax 
payments tend to be viewed as fair when tax payers have the opportunity to co-determine how 
the tax money will be spent. In this study as well as in Pommerehne 1985 it is also shown that 
tax evasion in communities and Cantons in Switzerland occurs less frequently when the tax 
payers have a political right to participate. Alm, Clelland and Schulze 1992 come to the result, 
that the individuals exhibit much diversity in their behavior and the main reasons for tax 
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compliance are the overweighting of the low probability of audit and the taxpayers valuation 
of the public goods. A comprehensive explanation about the tax reporting decisions, and why 
they cannot be predicted accurately by conventional economic analysis can be found by Kim, 
Evans and Moser 2005. 
Neuroeconomics also provides a possible explanation for the high tax compliance of test 
persons, which cannot be explained by the model of homo oeconomicus. Harbaugh, Mayr and 
Burghart 2007 show that both required contributions and voluntary payments to a non-profit 
organization lead to similar brain activity among test persons as payments in their favor. The 
authors see in this observation confirmation both for the motive of pure altruism and the 
motive of a “warm glow of giving,” which is the benefit that the test person receives through 
his/her own voluntary donation.  
Another body of literature attempts to measure subjective tax effects of contributions and 
subjective judgments of their fairness. According to Frey and Eichenberger 1996, the 
opportunity for taxpayers to participate in political tax questions is sufficient to increase tax 
satisfaction. Jonas, Heine, and Frey 1999 address the psychological variables which influence 
tax satisfaction.  
Heinemann et al. 2007 come to the conclusion that the acceptance of tax reforms does not 
only depend upon objective criteria but also upon the way in which these reforms are 
presented to taxpayers. In public finance and tax accounting literature the thesis is commonly 
found that the naming of a contribution may influence the subjective perceived burden 
(Graumann and Fröhlich 1957, pp. 429f.; Franzen 2008, pp. 75f.). Schmölders 1960, pp. 82f., 
with further references, cites examples from the German fiscal system (miner residential 
construction charges, fire brigade tax, Notopfer Berlin [Berlin sacrifice]) as well as french 
taxes (fonds national, aide). However, to our knowledge there are no studies which 
empirically test this thesis. 
The study conducted here builds upon this line of evasion research in that the name and 
designated use of a contribution can influence the tax resistance beyond the subjective sense 
of burden. The influence that the labeling of a contribution has on the perceived burden 
relates to the research on tax fairness. The connection between the evidence and the 
presentation of tax reform is obvious: precisely this thesis should be put to the test here. The 
goal of this study is to empirically analyze the influence of the presentation and labeling of a 
contribution as well as its appropriation (earmarking) on the subjective net burden of this 
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contribution and thereby to either confirm or rebut the thesis regarding the influence of such 
provisions on tax resistance. 
 
3. Theory 
The initial hypothesis for this study is that the behavior of the test persons can be explained 
according to neoclassical theory, which refers back to a rationally acting decision maker who 
solely maximizes the utility of his/her personal consumption. The taxpayers’ consumption 
utility potential is reduced by the amount of the contributions. On the contrary, the amount of 
the contributions (income tax, compulsory health insurance, and education allowance) in our 
model do not have any explicit influence on the consideration which taxpayers directly face, 
either because such direct considerations do not occur (income tax, education allowance) or 
because their amount is explicitly assumed to remain unchanged (health insurance coverage). 
Therefore, a rationally acting maximizer of consumption utility should, when deciding 
between various combinations of contributions, focus solely on the criteria of the amount of 
the contribution and always favor the combination which (assuming constant gross pay) offers 
the highest possible net pay and therefore the maximum consumption potential (net income 
maximization). 
According to this hypothesis, the name of a contribution (labeling) cannot influence the 
perceived burden of the taxpayers. Any potential statement of the designated use (earmarking) 
cannot have an influence on the perceived burden as long as it deals with a matter in which 
the particular contribution amount does not directly increase the consumption potential of the 
taxpayers.  
The utility function for net income maximization is presented in the following formula: 
U = U [N] 
with N = W – T – HIP – EdAl,  and 0U
N





   (diminishing 
marginal utility). 
N represents the financial target value, in this case the net pay of the decision maker, W 
represents the gross pay, T the income tax, HIP the premium for compulsory health insurance, 
and EdAl a new education allowance.  
The initial hypothesis under the assumption of a rationally acting net pay maximizer is stated 
as follows:  
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1H :  For a given gross pay amount and given consideration from the system of contributions, 
taxpayers will choose between combinations of contributions in such a manner as to 
maximize their net income and therefore their consumption utility. 
Now the contra thesis to H1 should be developed. The subjective net burden is understood 
below to be the subjective burden of a contribution that is relevant to taxpayers' decisions. If 
the contribution has non-financial advantages from the perspective of the taxpayer, then these 
advantages cause a drop in his/her subjective net burden of this contribution. 
The subjective perceived net burden of the taxpayer and therefore also the decision between 
combinations of contributions could be influenced by the labeling of a contribution. Whereas 
in net income maximization every type of contribution burden should be avoided which 
causes a decrease in the individual consumption potential, taxpayers could in reality factor the 
labeling of a contribution into their net burden calculations and therefore also into their 
decisions, even if their own consumption potential decreases in the process.  
In such a way taxpayers might be more willing to bear the tax payable imposed upon them (in 
other words have a lower subjective perceived net burden) if the name of the contribution 
convinces them of the need for and the significance of this contribution. In addition to the 
egoistic behavior of homo oeconomicus, the target function is here extended to include a 
limited egoistic or even an altruistic motive. A contribution labeled as a general education 
allowance could therefore receive wider acceptance among taxpayers than a contribution 
labeled as a tax, if for instance taxes are associated with wastefulness by many taxpayers. The 
first contra thesis to H1 reads as follows: 
2H :  The labeling of a contribution influences the perceived net burden of this contribution 
and therefore the selection of taxpayers between combinations of contributions.  
However, one must here consider that the pure labeling of a contribution (e.g. education 
allowance) does not initially reveal anything about the concrete use of this contribution. The 
general labeling education allowance thus does not state whether the revenues from this 
contribution will be used for example to fund schools, universities, or general education 
projects such as community colleges, libraries, or museums.  
The other tested contra thesis pertains to the appropriation or earmarking of a contribution. 
Taxes are – in contrast to social contributions – usually not provided with appropriations 
(Non-Earmarking Principle, see e.g. McCleary 1991, p. 82). However, a non-enforceable 
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political "pledge" could be given for a particular allocation of funds. In this way, 
appropriations would be possible for social contributions as well as for taxes.  
It is questionable as to whether an appropriation can increase the acceptance of a contribution 
(McCleary 1991, p. 85). If taxpayers consider a particular cause for which a contribution is 
designated especially worthwhile, then they might be willing to accept a decrease in their 
consumption potential in order to support this cause. A similar behavioral pattern arises-for 
instance, concerning the willingness to give donations to non-profit organizations or 
particularly worthy causes. Accordingly, wage earners could, instead of choosing the 
alternative which offers them the highest net income, intentionally relinquish a portion of 
their consumption potential in order to support an allocation of funds which they consider 
worthwhile, without receiving a concrete service for it in return. 
In this study, the appropriation was modeled by strictly establishing the use of the education 
allowance. The test persons were divided into two groups, of which one group received no 
detailed information regarding the use of the education allowance. The other group was 
informed about the concrete use of this contribution: Fifty percent of the education 
contribution was to be dispersed to schools and vocational schools, 25% to colleges and 
universities, and 25% to preschool education, since it was expected that the eligibility for the 
financing of this cause would, in general, be viewed positively by the population.  
Two different conjoint analyses were conducted, which differed based on the following 
points: 
 In the first conjoint analysis, test persons were explicitly told that the tax revenue from 
the tested contribution (education allowance) was not earmarked. In this setting, solely a 
labeling effect was to be active, which resulted either from irrational behavior or from a 
"vague signal" for a possible appropriation. 
 In the second conjoint analysis an earmarked education allowance was tested. In this 
case, a labeling effect as well as definite earmarking were present.  
This approach leads to the proposition of an additional sub-hypothesis as well as a contra 
hypothesis to 1H : 
3H :  The announced use of a contribution influences the perceived net burden of this 
contribution and therefore the selection of taxpayers between combinations of 
contributions.  
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The two influential factors studied, labeling and earmarking, are not completely free from 
overlap, since the name of a contribution could be understood by taxpayers as a signal for the 
appropriation. However, it is possible to differentiate between a contribution with “lower” 
appropriation (solely by labeling of the contribution) and a contribution with “higher” 
appropriation (by a promised use): How does a “vague signal” for a possible appropriation 
(e.g. solidarity surcharge) act compared to a clearly signaled earmark, which is certain upon 
introduction of the contribution? 
 
4. Method 
4.1 Conjoint Analysis 
The testing of the above mentioned hypotheses was carried out based on two conjoint 
analyses. Conjoint analysis consists of a procedure which was originally developed in the 
field of psychology (Luce and Tukey 1964) and later also found wide spread use in market 
research (Green and Srinivasan 1978, pp. 103f.). In conjoint analysis, test persons are 
assigned the task of evaluating various bundles of attributes (“stimuli”) according to their 
preferences (CONsider JOINTly), either by explicit evaluation (rating) or by indicating an 
order of precedence based on advantageousness (ranking). The measured total utility of the 
various bundles of attributes are used to calculate part worth utilities and the relative 
importance of the single attributes. A conjoint analysis consists furthermore of a 
decompositional procedure, which generally assumes an additive relationship of the part 
worth utilities in regard to the total utility (Hair et al. 2008). The advantage of the procedure 
is that test persons can holistically evaluate the objects to be analyzed, such that the demands 
on the test persons are lower and biases due to cognitively directed over/under weighting can 
be avoided. In result, the conjoint analysis can be used to split up the total utility of a bundle 
of attributes into the part worth utilities of the individual attributes and their relative weights. 
Since in a conjoint analysis the test persons have to give a simultaneous evaluation of 
different attributes, they must consider the same trade-off effects between the individual 
attributes which also exist in reality.   
It would also be conceivable to question the test persons directly regarding the burden of 
individual contributions. The majority of test persons were however not in a position to give 
consistent estimates of the burden which also take such trade-off effects into account. The test 
persons would probably tend to rate all attributes as especially important and therefore 
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overestimate the individual attributes in a bundle of attributes The procedure of conjoint 
analysis was therefore chosen since it sets lower demands by far on the test persons.  
Conjoint analysis has already been used sporadically to measure tax effects. Milliron and Toy 
1988 adopts conjoint analysis to research influential factors with regard to tax compliance. 
Hundsdoerfer and Sichtmann 2009 investigate the influence of taxation on investment 
decisions with the help of conjoint analysis. Blaufus and Ortlieb 2009 study the influence of 
tax complexity on employee decisions regarding company pension plans. To our knowledge, 
conjoint analysis has not yet been used to measure the influence of labeling and earmarking 
on the subjective burden of this contribution.  
4.2 Sample 
The data collection took place in December 2008 and January 2009 in the form of 
standardized one-on-one interviews with specially trained interviewers. In addition to the 
conjoint analysis, further questions were asked regarding demographic attributes, the general 
assessment of fiscal policy, and individual knowledge of German income tax law. The survey 
lasted on average 20 minutes per test person.   
Test persons were selected from among gainfully employed individuals, since these persons 
would be burdened by taxes and other contributions and therefore have experience with the 
German system of contributions. Gainfully employed individuals include, for purposes of this 
survey, all employees, public officials, and self-employed workers. Short interruptions to 
employment, for instance due to parental leave, maternity leave, etc. were not problematic.  
The selection of test persons followed a quota schedule1 which corresponded pro rata with the 
total working population in terms of the attributes gender, age, education, and income level. 
The corresponding frequency in the population for the year 2006 was taken from the 
statistical almanac for 2008 from the Federal Statistical Office in Germany, in which 37 
million people comprised the working population in Germany. This was done to avoid bias 
from a non-representative composition of the sample since a representative random sample 
was not possible for financial reasons.  
The conjoint analysis was conducted with a total of 542 test persons. This group was divided 
in two subgroups: 274 test persons (non-earmarking group) received no additional 
information about the appropriation of the contribution “education allowance,” whereas 268 
                                                 
1 Quota samples do not strictly fulfill the requirements of a pure random selection. Nevertheless they are the 
most widely used procedure in marketing research and consistently yield good results in comparative studies 
with pure random selection (see Green et al. 1988, pp. 325-327). 
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test persons (earmarking group) received additional information regarding the concrete use of 
the contribution.  
Compliance with the quota schedule was statistically tested. No significant difference 
between sample and population could be detected at the 5% level of confidence, and the 
sample can therefore be seen as representative in regard to the studied traits. Also between the 
two groups in the sample (non-earmarking group and earmarking group), no significant 
difference could be identified in regard to the quota schedule at the 5% level of confidence. 
The sample is composed of the individual attribute traits as follows:  
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Male 291 53.7 % 54.8 % 
Gender 
Female 251 46.3 % 45.2 % 
Under 20 Years 20 3.7 % 3.5 % 
20 – 29 Years 93 17.2 % 17.5 % 
30 – 39 Years 127 23.4 % 24.0 % 
40 – 49 Years 152 28 % 29.6 % 
50 – 59 Years 115 21.2 % 20.5 % 
Age 
Over 60 Years 35 6.5 % 5.1 % 
No School Leaving 
Certificate 11 

















15.9 % 14.5 % 
University Degree 101 18.6 % 16.0 % 
Education2 
Other 44 8.1 % 9.1 % 
Under 1,000 Euro 164 30.3 % 32.7 % 
1,000 – 2,000 Euro  253 46.7 % 44.8 % 
2,000 – 3,000 Euro 82 15.1 % 14.6 % 
Over 3,000 Euro 38 7.0 % 8.0 % 
Monthly Net Income 
Not Stated 5 0.9 % --- 
Table 1- Distribution of Quota Attributes 
 
4.3 Research Design and Operationalization of the Hypotheses 
The research objects consist of a combination of contributions which must be paid by the test 
persons. The test persons were placed in a fictitious situation in which they were asked to 
                                                 
2 Lower Secondary School equates the German „Hauptschule“, Secondary School equates the German 
„Realschule“ and University-Entrance Diploma equates the German „Abitur“. 
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rank combinations of contributions according to their preferences in determining the fiscal 
policy for an (unnamed) political party.3  
Every possible combination assumed a constant gross pay of 3,000 Euro. This gross pay was 
then reduced by three different deductions. These deductions included a general income tax, a 
health insurance premium, and a newly introduced educational allowance. The amount of the 
individual traits were 700 or 740 Euro for income tax, 200 or 280 Euro for compulsory health 
insurance premiums, and 0 or 60 Euro for the education allowance. We explicitly advised the 
test persons that the health insurance premiums are independent of their actual received health 
insurance payments. 
The net pay was also given for each stimulus to prevent arithmetic errors from distorting the 
test persons’ results. There were a total of eight different possible combinations in the study 
(complete design), which were to be ranked by test persons’ during the course of the analysis 
according to their preferences. Each stimulus received a different combination of the traits of 
the three attributes (income tax, compulsory health insurance, education allowance).  
The individual contribution combinations of the stimuli in the complete design are presented 
in the following table: 




A low = 700 € no low  = 200 € 
B low = 700 € yes  (60 €) high = 280 € 
C high = 740 € yes  (60 €) low  = 200 € 
D high = 740 € no  high = 280 € 
E high = 740 € no              low  = 200 € 
F low = 700 € yes  (60 €) low  = 200 € 
G high = 740 € yes  (60 €) high = 280 € 
H low = 700 € no high = 280 € 
Table 2 – Contribution Combinations of Stimuli in Complete Design 
 
The test persons were asked to assign the stimulus with their highest preference the lowest 
rank in the sequence and the stimulus with their lowest preference the highest rank. After a 
                                                 
3 This ranking is the most common valuation procedure after the rating scale. An overview of various procedures 
can be found in Green and Srinivasan 1978, pp. 104f. 
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test person had completed the sequence the interviewer once again mentioned the possibility 
to make changes. When the test person did not wish to make further changes, the final 
sequence was documented by the interviewer.  
The use of the education allowance was not stipulated in the first conjoint analysis (non-
earmarking). In this case explicit information was given to the test persons that tax revenue 
from the education allowance went into the general national budget and was not earmarked. In 
the second conjoint analysis (earmarking), test persons received detailed information 
regarding the use of the education allowance: Twenty-five percent of revenues from the 
education allowance were to be used for preschool education in nursery schools and day-care 
centers for children, 25% for improvements to colleges and universities, and 50% for 
improvements to schools and vocational schools.  
The sequences we collected can be used to test the initial hypothesis (hypothesis H1). Each 
sequence created by a test person can be compared with the rational sequence that a homo 
oeconomicus would choose in order to maximize his/her net income.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Analysis of Ranking Behavior 
The rational model of a net income maximizing homo oeconomicus provides a reference point 
for the examination of the empirically observed rank order of the preferred contribution 
system. This rational decision maker will always aim to minimize his/her contribution burden 
and therefore maximize his/her net income.  
The following table shows the total contributions and the maximum attainable net income of 
the individual stimuli: 
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Stimulus Total Contributions Net Income 
A 900 € 2,100 € 
B 1,040 € 1,960 € 
C 1,000 € 2,000 € 
D 1,020 € 1,980 € 
E 940 € 2,060 € 
F 960 € 2,040 € 
G 1,080 € 1,920 € 
H 980 € 2,020 € 
Table 3 – Total Contributions and Net Income 
 
If one ranks the stimuli according to maximum attainable net income then it results in the 
following rational sequence 
AEFHCDBG, 
since in this case the stimulus with the highest net pay is in first place and the ranking of the 
stimuli follows the total contributions.  
In order to check how many test persons followed the example of the rational decision maker, 
the following table provides an overview of the number of rational sequences in the total 
sample.  
Ranking Number of Test Persons 
Percentage of 
Test Persons 
Rational 142 26.2 % 
Other 400 73.8 % 
Table 4 - Rational Sequence 
 
From Table 4 it becomes clear that the vast majority of test persons decided against a rational 
sequence. This result cannot be due to arithmetic errors since for every stimulus the exact net 
pay (gross pay – contributions) was indicated. Thus, rational net income maximization simply 
required the sorting of the stimuli according to net pay. Only 26.20% (142 individuals) of the 
test persons ranked all of the stimuli according to the rational rank order. 73.80 % (400 
individuals) instead chose another sequence. A t-Test can be used to further confirm that the 
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deviations from rational behavior are statistically significant. Hence, the test persons do not 
appear to hold to the rational guidelines of the theory when creating their sequences.  
The following table shows the rank placing of the individual stimuli in the total sample: 
Stimulus N Median Mean Standard Deviation 
Stimulus A (L-L-L) 542 1 2.63 2.090 
Stimulus B (L-H-H) 542 7 5.38 2.067 
Stimulus C (H-H-L) 542 5 4.01 1.645 
Stimulus D (H-L-H) 542 6 6.29 1.426 
Stimulus E (H-L-L) 542 3 3.79 2.049 
Stimulus F (L-H-L) 542 3 2.75 1.641 
Stimulus G (H-H-H) 542 8 6.56 1.966 
Stimulus H (L-L-H) 542 4 4.58 1.557 
Table 5 – Average Rank Placing of the Individual Stimuli 
 
The mean is here of particular interest. The mean indicates the average rank placing of a 
stimulus over the total sample. According to this average rank placing, the following 
sequence of stimuli results:  
AFECHBDG. 
From Table 5 it becomes apparent that: 
 Stimulus A has the lowest mean and therefore on average the best rank placing. This 
reflects the behavior of a net income maximizer. The same is true of stimulus G, which 
was valued the worst both in net income maximization and on average in the sample. 
 The sequence of stimuli according to the average of the test persons (mean) deviates 
from the sequence of stimuli in net income maximization. This leads to the assumption 
that the test persons do not follow the principle of net income maximization in their 
decision making.  
The behavior of the decision maker can therefore not be explained or predicted using the 
assumption of a homo oeconomicus. Hypothesis H1 can thus be rejected. A further step must 
be used to test to what extent this deviation can be explained through the labeling of the 
contribution “education allowance” and the contribution “health insurance premium” 
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(hypothesis H2) and the earmarking of the contribution “education allowance” (hypothesis 
H3). 
 
5.2 Influence of Labeling on the Perceived Burden  
5.2.1 Education Allowance 
According to hypothesis H2, the labeling of a contribution leads to a change in the perceived 
net burden of this contribution and therefore to a shift in contribution preferences. Thus, a 
contribution labeled as an “education allowance” should, according to hypothesis H2, be 
evaluated differently by test persons than other contributions in a system of contribution 
combinations. In order to eliminate bias in the effect of labeling caused by the explicitly 
named appropriation of the education allowance (earmarking), the influence of labeling was 
first analyzed separately within the non-earmarking group.  
Conjoint analysis makes it possible for each test person to measure the part-worth utilities of 
the individual attributes for his/her own sequence. The part-worth utilities were estimated 
with the ordinary least square method (OLS). 4 Therefore the differences between the average 
of all ranks and the empirical ranks for each factor value were calculated. This difference is 
the part-worth utility of an individual character trait which was standardized for comparison. 
The part-worth utility is therefore a measure of the value that a test person attaches to an 
attribute trait within the total attribute bundle. In this conjoint analysis the part-worth utility 
represents the utility that a test person assigns to a contribution in a certain amount.  
As a means of comparison, the part-worth utilities of the attributes could also be measured for 
a rational maximizer of consumption utility who ranks the stimuli solely according to the 
attainable net pay (Hundsdoerfer and Sichtmann 2009). In this way in can be tested whether 
test persons assign a systematically higher value to the attribute trait “education allowance is 
levied” as would be the case in the rational model. The correlation between the total utility of 
a stimulus and the individual part-worth utility is – as is customary in conjoint analysis – 
assumed to be additive. That means that the sum of the individual part-worth utilities of the 
attributes of a stimulus corresponds to the total utility.5 The following table shows the 
                                                 
4 Monotone variance analysis could be used to determine the part-worth utilities since the preference judgments 
of the test persons show an ordinal standard of measurement. In accordance with common procedure, the 
Ordinary Least Squares Method was chosen in this case, since this method has proven to be very robust in the 
estimation of part-worth utilities of ordinally scaled dependent variables. See Green and Krieger 1993, p. 478. 
5 This conclusion is based on the assumption that the explanatory variables do not interact. See Hair et al., 2008.  
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standardized6 part-worth utilities and relative significance which result from the sample7 as 
well as the respective values in a rational sequence: 
 Standardized Part-worth Utility (in %)
Relative Significance 
(in %) 
 Rational Sample Rational Sample 
Income Tax high 0.00 1.12 
Income Tax low 20.00 19.74 
20.00 20.86 
Education Allowance 0.00 12.92 
No Education Allowance 33.33 27.29 
33.33 40.21 
Health Insurance high 0.00 1.53 
Health Insurance low 46.67 37.40 
46.67 38.93 
Table 6 – Part-worth Utilities and Relative Significance (Non-Earmarking Group) 
 
Table 6 clearly shows that particularly the part-worth utilities for the education allowance in 
the sample deviate from the rational part-worth utilities of a homo oeconomicus. These results 
can be interpreted as follows: Whereas the characteristic “no education allowance” of a 
stimulus for a rational test person accounts for 1/3 (33.33%) of the maximum total utility, for 
the average test person this is only 27.29%. This outcome suggests that a contribution 
declared to be an education allowance finds wider acceptance than an income tax.  
76 of the 274 test persons in this part sample (non-earmarking group) preferred stimuli which 
levied the education allowance, so the part-worth utility (mean) for the attribute (“education 
allowance is levied”) is at 12.92% clearly greater than zero. Across all test persons the 
difference between part-worth utility mean of the attributes “no education allowance” and 
“education allowance is levied” (27.29%-12.92% = 14.37%) showed that an increase in the 
education allowance from 0 to 60 € would burden the test persons noticeably less than would 
an increase in income taxes of 40 € (difference = 19.74% - 1.12% = 18.62%).  
A T-Test was also conducted for this group in order to reach a conclusion regarding the 
influence of labeling on the acceptance of the contribution “education allowance.” It showed a 
deviation of the part-worth utility for the attribute trait “education allowance is levied” from 
the rational value (which resulted from net income maximizing behavior) that was significant 
at a 1% level. Many test persons apparently include in the evaluation of the attribute 
                                                 
6 The part-worth utilities were standardized on a uniform scale of measurement and with a uniform zero-point. 
7 Sample here refers only to the non-earmarking group.  
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“education allowance is levied” not only the decrease in their consumption potential, but also 
attach positive importance to the promotion of education.  
If test persons were willing to pay the education allowance and to relinquish a portion of their 
net income irrespective of how high the additional expenses were, then the sequence selected 
by these test persons would appear as follows: FCBGAEHD. Here the sequence of 
the test persons corresponds to the rational sequence in regard to the attributes income tax and 
health insurance, however the stimuli with the trait “education allowance is levied” occupy 
the first four places. It’s a matter of an extreme case of endorsement for the education 
allowance among otherwise rationally acting test persons. The following table reflects the 
frequency of this sequence compared to a completely rational sequence for the non-
earmarking group (NE):  
Ranking Number of Test Persons (NE) 
Percentage of Test 
Persons (NE) Total Sample 
Rational 80 29.20 % 142 (26.20%) 
Pro Education 
Allowance 14 5.11 % 47 (8.67%) 
Other 180 65.69 % 353 (65.13%) 
Sum 274 100.00 % 542 (100.00%) 
Table 7 – Sequences “Pro Education Allowance” with Non-Earmarking 
 
From Table 7 it becomes evident that a total of 14 of 274 test persons selected a sequence that 
was rational in the sense of a homo oeconomicus except for the attribute “education 
allowance” and do not perceive the education allowance as a burden to be avoided. A 
binomial test can further be used to show that the number of sequences carried out in this 
form present no statistically random result. Therefore it can also be proven that a significant 
percentage of test persons intentionally chose the strategy “pro education allowance” instead 
of “contribution minimization” and therefore chose the contributions with additional 
expenses. This clearly already appears sufficient to provide a contribution with a positive 
description. 
Hypothesis H2 is therefore confirmed for the education allowance: The perceived net burden 
from a contribution is clearly dependent upon its labeling. 
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5.2.2 Health Insurance Premium 
In addition to the previously established positive influence of the label “education allowance,” 
it was studied whether the description of a contribution with “health insurance premium” 
influenced the perceived burden in contrast to a general income tax. In order to study this 
aspect we divided the sample into two subgroups. We sub-divided each data set in such a 
manner as if the test persons had ranked each individual stimulus with an education allowance 
and without an education allowance. Therefore per test person two fictitious conjoint analyses 
each with four stimuli were generated, in which only the attributes “income tax” and “health 
insurance premium” were varied and the education allowance remained constant (in one case 
60 Euro and in the other case 0 Euro). In this manner the effects of the labeling of the health 
insurance premium compared to income tax could be isolated. 
The calculated part-worth utilities can be taken from the following table: 










Allowance 31.86% 3.32% 61.75% 3.08% 
No Education 




33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 
Table 8 – Part-worth Utilities  Separated by Groups “Education Allowance” and “No Education 
Allowance” 
 
The burden from the health insurance premium is in both groups noticeably less as it would 
be under consumption rational net income maximization. Test persons appear to value an 
additional burden due to the compulsory health insurance not as strongly negative as an 
equivalent additional burden with income tax.8 Thus the term “health insurance premium” 
seems to be positive compared to income tax, or the test persons have – in contrast to the 
information that they received from us – associated a higher reward from compulsory health 
insurance with a higher health insurance premium.  
                                                 
8 The margin between low and high income tax is 40 Euro, which is half of the margin between the low and high 
health insurance premium. Accordingly, under rational net income maximization the part-worth utilities of the 
low income tax is half as high as for the low health insurance. For a comparison between the burden from health 
insurance and the income tax the part-worth utilities of the low income tax can be doubled. Then one recognizes 
– especially in the case without education allowance – the burden from an increase in the health insurance 
premium is lower than the burden from an increase in income tax.  
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When the test persons were confronted with an education allowance (group “education 
allowance”), then a high health insurance premium is a noticeably stronger burden than in the 
case in which no education allowance is collected. For test persons who are more strongly 
burdened through a higher health insurance premium than through a low one (the normal 
case), a difference of 4.35 percentage points results.9 The economic intuition behind this 
result is obvious: If test persons are willing to pay for an education allowance, then their 
inclination decreases to also “voluntarily” pay a higher health insurance premium. This result 
was controlled with a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test and is significant on a 10% level of 
confidence. 
Therefore, a labeling effect can also be determined for the health insurance premium. This 
effect diminishes when an additional burden by means of an education allowance exists 
simultaneously.  
 
5.3 Influence of Earmarking on the Perceived Burden  
It was shown above that the labeling of a contribution can change its acceptance among test 
persons. It is doubtful whether this effect is affected when test persons are explicitly informed 
of the purpose for which this contribution is to be used. The additional revenue generated by 
this increase in contributions should be explicitly assigned a previously determined use 
(earmarking). As mentioned above, a subgroup of test persons were given additional 
information for this purpose. Test persons in this subgroup were explicitly informed of the use 
of the education allowance. 
The following part-worth utilities resulted for the test persons who received this additional 
information. For the sake of comparison the rational values as well as the results of the non-
earmarking group are listed: 
 
                                                 
9 In order to be able to subtract the part-worth utilities for the health insurance premium from one another, we 
excluded the test persons who had chosen a high health insurance premium over a low health insurance premium 
(“reversals”). For the low education allowance (N=504), one received a part-worth utility of the low health 
insurance premium of 60.38%, and for the high education allowance (N=517) a part-worth utility of 64.73%. 
The fact that the number of reversals for a low education allowance (542-504=38) is higher than for a high 
education allowance (542-517=25) also supports the results.  
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Part-worth Utility Relative Significance 
 
Rational Non-Earmark Earmark Rational 
Non-
Earmark Earmark 
Income Tax high 0.00 % 1.12 % 0.76 % 
Income Tax low 20.00 % 19.74 % 20.52 % 
20.00 % 20.86 % 21.28 % 
Education Allowance 0.00 % 12.92 % 24.54 % 
No Education Allowance 33.33 % 27.29 % 17.28 % 
33.33 % 40.21 % 41.82 % 
Health Insurance high 0.00 % 1.53 % 1.38 % 
Health Insurance low 46.67 % 37.40 % 35.67 % 
46.67 % 38.93 % 36.90 % 
Table 9 – Part-worth Utilities and Relative Significance (Earmarking Group) 
 
In order to test whether there is a significant difference between the distribution within the 
earmarking and non-earmarking groups in regard to the acceptance of the education 
allowance, a Wilcoxon-/Mann-Whitney-U-Test was conducted. The test showed at a level of 
confidence less than 0.001% that there is a significant shift in the distribution function 
between the two groups.  
In order to illustrate the exclusive effects of earmarking on the perceived burden, it will first 
be shown using a linear regression model, what influence the appropriation of the education 
allowance has on its perceived burden. As an dependent variable we used the part-worth 
utility of the high education allowance. We coded membership in the earmarking group with 
1 and membership in the non-earmarking group with 0. The following table displays the 
results of the regression: 
Regression Model Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.129 0.016 
Earmarking 0.116 0.023 
Table 10 - Regression Earmarking Effects 
 
The evaluation of this regression yields a constant of 12.9% and a regression coefficient of 
11.6%. So the appropriation leads to an average increase in the part-worth utility of an 
education allowance of 11.6%.10 So the subjective burden of the education allowance is 
                                                 
10 This values are identical to the mean of the part-worth utilities in the non-earmarking group (12.9%) and the 
mean in the earmarking group (12.9%+11.6%=24.5%). The values of the regression model just illustrate this 
values. A t-test is not meaningful because the values for the part-worth utility does not archive the appropriate 
assumptions for this test. 
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significantly lower if the test persons were informed about the specific appropriation for the 
tax revenue. Therefore hypothesis H3 is confirmed: The appropriation of a contribution has an 
influence on the subjective burden of this contribution. The average net burden of the 
contribution “education allowance” decreases further if the test persons are convinced of its 
validity not only through the labeling of the contribution but also through its earmarking.  
In our study the effect is so strong that with earmarking the education allowance no longer 
presents a net burden. This is shown in Table 9: The mean value of the part-worth utilities of 
the high education allowance is more than 7 percentage points higher than the mean value of 
the part-worth utilities of the low education allowance. Therefore the high education 
allowance creates on average in the “earmarking” group a higher total utility than the low 
education allowance.  
The following table serves to clarify how many test persons in the earmarking group (E) 
consciously chose the high education allowance but otherwise behaved rationally.  
Ranking Number of Test Persons (E) 
Percentage of 
Test Persons (E) Total Sample 
Rational 62 23.13 % 142 (26.20 %) 
Pro Education 
Allowance 33 12.31 % 47 (8.67 %) 
Other 173 64.55 % 353 (65.13 %) 
Sum 268 100.00 % 542 (100.00%) 
Table 11 - Sequence "Pro Education Allowance" with Earmarking 
 
If one compares these results with the values in Table 7 then it also becomes clear here that in 
the earmarking group strikingly more test persons chose the “pro education allowance” who 
otherwise chose a rational sequence (12.31%). This also confirms the hypothesis that the 
perceived tax burden can be decreased through the earmarking of a contribution.  
Hypothesis H3 is therefore also confirmed: In addition to the labeling of a contribution, the 
perceived net burden of a contribution can sink further if the contribution is earmarked for a 
special use which appears to be seen as especially worthwhile by numerous test persons.  
 
5.4 Influence of Individual Attributes  
In order to test to what extent demographic data can explain the results, different non 
parametric test methods were carried out in which the dependent variable consisted of the 
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part-worth utility of a levied education allowance. We differed the sample in different classes 
regarding the education level, age, gender, and income and tested each classes against each 
other for differences with respect to their part-worth utility for the high education allowance. 
The used test methods were the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test for two classes comparisons 
and the Kruskal-Wallis-Test for testing more than two classes. The following table provides 
an overview of the influence factors studied:  
Test classes Test method Results 
Earmarking vs. Non-Earmarking Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test 
p<0,001***; Earmark: 
Mean: 12.92%; 95% Konf.: 
10.1-15.75%; Non-
Earmark: Mean: 24.54%; 
95% Konf: 21.07-28.00% 
Education level (at least 
University-Entrance Diploma vs. 
Secondary School Leaving 
Certificate and Lower Secondary 
School Leaving Certificate)11  
Kruskal-Wallis-




Income level (<1000; -2000; -
3000; >3000) 
Kruskal-Wallis-
Test not significant 
Age (<=20; -30; -40; -50; -60; 
>60) 
Kruskal-Wallis-
Test not significant 
Gender Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test not significant 
Table 12 – Explanation of the Labeling Effect with respect to individual attributes 
 
Other than for the attribute earmarking, no significant influence of the demographic attributes 
on the willingness to pay the education allowance with exception of the education level can 
be determined. Solely the attribute “Lower Secondary School” allows the conclusion to be 
drawn at a 5 % level of confidence that students at a lower secondary school tend to be less 
willing to voluntarily pay for education than students with at least University-Entrance 
Diploma.12 We made the same tests for the dependent variable high health insurance 
premium, but without any significant results. 
  
                                                 
11 We excluded the class  “No school leaving certificate“ because of the small sample size and the class “Others” 
because of the lack of interpretability. 
12 This was confirmed by pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Tests. Only the test between the class ”at least 
University-Entrance Diploma” and “Lower Secondary School Leaving Certificate” shows a significant result at a 
5 % level of confidence (p-value: 0.012). 
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6. Discussion 
The purpose of this article was to test whether the name of a contribution and its earmarking 
can influence the perceived contribution burden of working persons. The model of a rational 
maximizer of consumption utility served as a reference, under which individuals attempt to 
avoid all contribution burdens which provide no concrete reward.  
In order to test this question empirically, we applied the instrument of conjoint analysis. We 
polled 542 gainfully employed individuals in Germany. The task of the test persons was to 
rank various combinations of contributions. From these rankings we derived part-worth 
utilities and the relative significance of the attributes of the individual contributions, which we 
could then compare with part-worth utilities and the relative significance of a fictitious 
rational maximizer of consumption utility.  
In the total sample only one-fourth of the test persons actually chose the rational behavior 
described by economic theory. The initial hypothesis that taxpayers always and exclusively 
strive to maximize their net pay and therefore their consumption potential must be rejected.  
The labeling of the contribution (as “income tax,” “health insurance premium,” or “education 
allowance,”) and the description (earmarking) of the appropriation of the “education 
allowance” influence the perceived burden through this contribution. In order to distinguish 
the labeling effect and the earmarking effect from one another, test persons were divided into 
two subgroups of which only one received additional information about the allocation of 
revenues from the education allowance. For the group that received no additional information 
regarding the allocation of funds, a statistically significant and economically relevant 
difference could be identified between the rational and the empirically proven sequencing 
behavior (labeling effect). It became clear that some test persons assigned a positive part-
worth utility to a high but not concretely earmarked education allowance although this is 
associated with a decrease in their net income. The labeling of a contribution therefore has an 
influence on its acceptance. A similar but also weaker effect in the same direction could be 
observed for the contribution “health insurance premium.”  
An appropriation of the contribution “education allowance” significantly strengthened this 
effect. On average the test persons no longer described this contribution as a burden (negative 
net burden). 
These results mean for tax effects research that models which predict the conformance of 
decisions on general fiscal conditions based on the rationality hypothesis and which fail to 
25 
take into account either the labeling or the appropriation of contributions, may lead to 
inaccurate predictions. If our conclusions for working persons also apply to companies is an 
open research question.  
We think that the results found here are of great interest for future reforms to the tax and 
contribution systems. It was shown that not every contribution burden is perceived by 
taxpayers to be negative to the same extent. The labeling of a contribution and especially the 
definition of the use of the tax revenue generated led to an increase in the acceptance and 
willingness to pay among working individuals. An increase in acceptance likely also leads to 
diminished evasion and avoidance behavior and therefore lower transaction costs and tax 
collection costs.  
There are numerous links between the current study and possibilities for further research. For 
instance, the question arises as to what extent the labeling and appropriation of individual 
types of contributions can also lead to negative perceptions and therefore to an increase in the 
perceived tax burden. It should be considered when interpreting these results that this study 
dealt solely with a pure preference sequence, which had no economic consequences for the 
test person. There is need for further research which validates these results in connection with 
actual monetary incentives. As previously mentioned, the potential to transfer the results for 
contributions that are levied on a corporate level also remains to be tested.  
In conclusion, the study yields empirical findings regarding how taxpayers deviate from the 
model of a homo oeconomicus in their decision making and how this deviation can be 
influenced simply through the presentation of contributions. Fiscal decisions made by the 
taxpayers seem to be essentially determined through their subjective perception. Not only the 
name of a contribution but also in particular its appropriation influence the “tax satisfaction” 
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